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ARTICLES
Police Ignorance and (Un)Reasonable
Fourth Amendment Exclusion
Nadia Banteka *
The Fourth Amendment exclusion doctrine is as baffling as it is
ubiquitous. Although courts rely on it every day to decide Fourth Amendment
violations as well as defendants’ motions to suppress evidence obtained through
these violations, virtually every aspect of the doctrine is a subject of
fundamental disagreement and confusion. When defendants file motions to
suppress unlawfully obtained evidence, the government often argues that even
if a violation of the Fourth Amendment has transpired, the remedy of evidence
suppression is barred because the police acted in “good faith,” meaning the
officer reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believed the search or seizure was lawful.
Judges and commentators sharply disagree about whether and which police
mistakes of law are, in fact, reasonable so as to deny the application of the
exclusionary rule remedy. They also disagree on the nature and scope of the
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reasonableness standard and its impact on the very existence of the exclusionary
rule as a remedy against police misconduct.
This Article offers a new approach to the “good faith” exception doctrine
based on a revisionist reading stemming from the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Heien v. North Carolina. There is widespread consensus that the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule doctrine determines the application
of the evidence suppression remedy to acknowledged violations of the Fourth
Amendment. But I argue that the exception is, in fact, better understood as an
inquiry into the substance of Fourth Amendment rights and not into the
application of the remedy. After the Supreme Court holding in Heien that the
reasonableness of a police mistake of law is relevant in the evaluation of conduct
under the Fourth Amendment, there is no need for a “good faith” reasonableness
exception to the exclusionary rule remedy when that rule kicks in only after a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. This approach renders the “good faith
exception” to the exclusionary rule doctrine redundant. Instead of ruling that
the exclusionary rule does or does not apply, courts in these cases can simply
hold that an unreasonable search did or did not take place. This approach bears
a significant practical payoff: courts will no longer be able to declare broadly
that the police have violated the Fourth Amendment while in the same breath
undercutting the value of remedying this violation based on two different
questions on what constitutes one reasonable police officer.
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CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 405
INTRODUCTION
The “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule is one of the
most frequently invoked doctrines in criminal cases. 1 When a defendant
asks the trial court to suppress evidence collected by the police through
a violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, courts ask
whether the violation occurred and if so, whether suppressing the
evidence will further what the U.S. Supreme Court has held to be the
sole purpose of exclusion: deterrence of future police misconduct. 2 In
such cases, the government will often argue that even if an officer
violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, the defendant has no
remedy through evidence suppression because the police officer
reasonably believed the search or seizure aligned with the law. 3 In other
words, the police officer acted in “good faith” reliance on what she

1.
See, e.g., United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d 997, 1006 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding good faith
exception applied since it was reasonable for FBI officers to not know warrant was invalid); United
States v. Taylor, 935 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2019) (deciding officer’s reasonable reliance on
void warrant provides basis for good faith exception); United States v. Eldred, 933 F.3d 110, 119
(2d Cir. 2019) (deciding exclusionary rule seeks to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct); United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1089–90 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding software was
utilized in good faith); United States v. Ganzer, 922 F.3d 579, 590 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding law
enforcement officials acted with objectively reasonable good faith belief conduct was lawful);
United States v. Henderson, 906 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018) (ruling good faith exception may
apply to warrants void ab initio); United States v. Kienast, 907 F.3d 522, 528 (7th Cir. 2018)
(determining officers reasonably relied on magistrate’s determination that warrant was valid);
United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding good faith exception applies
to warrant used, precluding suppression); United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 323–24 (1st Cir.
2017) (finding law enforcement cannot be held accountable for magistrate’s mistake); United
States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding no bad faith by law enforcement and
balancing test applies); United States v. Stephens, 764 F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding good
faith exception applied to police officer reasonably relying on judicial precedent); United States v.
Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding good faith exception applied when police
relied on mistake of magistrate).
2.
See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (reiterating exclusionary rule
should only be used to deter and is not a guaranteed individual right); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 910 (1984) (noting deterrent purpose of exclusionary rule); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
486 (1976) (indicating deterrence as primary justification for exclusion of evidence); United States
v. Spann, 409 F. Supp. 3d 619, 625 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (ruling punishment of good faith actions will
not help deter police mistake of law).
3.
See United States v. Hawkins, 426 F. Supp. 3d 447, 455 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (denying
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence); United States v. Chalas-Felix, 424 F. Supp. 3d 316, 330
(D. Del. 2019) (deciding good faith exception applies to government conduct); United States v.
Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d 194, 208 (W.D.N.C. 2019) (holding police acted with objectively good faith
reliance on warrant).

368

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:2:365

thought was a lawful basis for the search or seizure, which does not
warrant evidence suppression.
Despite its procedural frequency, the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule remains surprisingly convoluted in doctrine. The case
law reflects deep uncertainty and disagreement about fundamental
questions, such as which mistakes of law are made in reasonable “good
faith,” what standard of reasonableness to apply, and how this inquiry
impacts the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations. 4 This rift has only deepened as scholars identify
incongruities in the doctrine. Some question the legal basis on which
reasonable good faith police mistakes of law bar the suppression of
unlawfully obtained evidence. 5 Others accept the premise but contend
it gives courts too much discretion to sanction police misconduct. 6 And
while scholars have offered critiques on the doctrine, there is currently
no clear path forward that can make the law of Fourth Amendment
exclusion more determinate than it is now.
Most approaches originate from the premise that the good faith
exception involves a question of remedy: When is a mistake of law in
searches or seizures sufficiently reasonable to bar the application of the
exclusionary rule remedy? 7 I argue instead that after the Court’s
decision in Heien v. North Carolina, 8 mistakes of law in searches or
seizures are inexorably tied up in the process of determining Fourth
Amendment questions. Under this revisionist approach, when courts
ask whether the police acted in good faith reasonable reliance on law,
they do not necessarily ask whether a violation of the defendant’s rights
is sufficiently excusable, or not sufficiently egregious, for the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule to apply. Rather, courts ask whether the
police officer’s reasonable mistake of law means there was a violation of
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in the first place. That is,
4.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.3(f) (5th ed. 2012) (analyzing fundamental concerns in light of Leon).
5.
See, e.g., Edwin Meesee III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake of Law
Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 738 (2012) (noting that mistake of law defense should
fail because all people are assumed to know the law); Gerald Leonard, Rape, Murder, and
Formalism: What Happens if We Define Mistake of Law? 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 507, 509–10 (2001)
(analyzing arguments for abolishing mistake of law doctrine).
6.
See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.3(3) (noting that the good faith exception should not
apply to cases with no initial Fourth Amendment violation); Andrew Z. Lipson, Note, The Good
Faith Exception as Applied to Illegal Predicate Searches: A Free Pass to Institutional Ignorance, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1167 (2009) (arguing that extending good faith exception to illegal predicate
searches could result in dramatic departure from precedent).
7.
See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Mistakes and Justice—Using the Pardon Power to Remedy a
Mistake of Law, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 658 (2017) (arguing that Congress should pass a
statute creating a mistake of law defense).
8.
574 U.S. 54 (2014).
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whether the mistake of law renders the search or seizure reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
This approach may appear redundant at first. As it stands, when
a trial court engages in the good faith exception analysis, the court has
often already found the police violated a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights due to an unreasonable search or seizure. For the
purposes of assessing whether to grant a defendant the exclusionary
rule remedy, the court then looks at whether, despite the violation, the
police acted under a reasonable mistake of law. But there is good reason
to resist this approach entailing two separate and distinct
reasonableness inquiries after the Court’s recent holding in Heien. The
inquiry into a police mistake of law is, in certain cases, best understood
as an inquiry into the Fourth Amendment itself and not the
exclusionary rule—that is, into the violation of the right and not the
application of the remedy. 9 This claim proceeds into three parts.
First, since the Court accepted in Heien that the reasonableness
of a mistaken belief that triggers constitutionally questionable conduct
is relevant to the evaluation of whether police conduct is constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment, 10 courts do not need to make a second
assessment regarding the reasonableness of this same mistake at the
exclusionary rule remedy stage. There is no need for a good faith
“reasonableness” exception to the exclusionary rule when that rule
kicks in only after a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
“reasonableness” requirement, since this requirement now
acknowledges instances of reasonable mistakes of law. If we revisit the
“good faith exception” strand of exclusionary rule doctrine in light of
Heien’s reasonableness analysis, it becomes redundant in most cases.
Second, and as a result of this revisionist reading, the good faith
exclusionary rule cases can now be best understood not as decisions that
involve the exclusionary rule but rather as displaced Fourth
Amendment holdings. This means that instead of ruling that the
exclusionary rule does or does not apply in one instance or another,
courts in these good faith exclusionary rule cases could simply have held
that a search was or was not unreasonable. Third, since the question of
“good faith” mistakes of law now forms part of the constitutional
inquiry, once courts answer the constitutional question in these cases,
the actual remedies question is easy: if the police mistake of law was
9.
See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1942–43
(2014) (analyzing the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause).
10. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 66 (“The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes,
and those mistakes—whether of fact or of law—must be objectively reasonable.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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reasonable, there is no need for the exclusionary rule remedy; if the
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because the
police mistake of law was not reasonable, the evidence must be
suppressed.
This way of thinking about Fourth Amendment exclusion has
immediate and significant implications. First, it analytically clarifies
the doctrine surrounding the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. The Court’s earlier insistence on following two separate inquiries
in assessing the reasonableness of a police mistake of law through
categorical or case-by-case standards of analysis is hard to reconcile
with the fact that searches and seizures can be reasonable or
unreasonable but not both at once. 11 This problem disappears, though,
once the reasonableness analysis of the mistake of law moves to the
inquiry into the potential violation of the Fourth Amendment. Second,
this approach will provide the space for constitutional evolution
through criminal proceedings and further the Court’s intention of
creating more bright-line rules to better train and guide police
officers. 12 Finally, courts will now have to directly confront difficult
constitutional questions instead of sweeping them under the rug of
remedial assessment. And while one cannot predict exactly how
doctrine will evolve, this approach, at the very least, will require courts
to be clearer about how police mistakes of law weigh into the balance
between individual privacy and government interests in policing.
Courts will no longer be able to declare broadly that the police have
violated the Fourth Amendment while in the same breath undercutting
the value of remedying this violation based on two different
assessments of what constitutes one reasonable police officer.
This Article explains and elaborates on this thesis in three parts.
Part I critically analyzes the two distinct developments in the
reasonableness and good faith exception doctrine within the Fourth
Amendment right and the exclusionary rule remedy. Part II lays out
my proposed revisionist approach on the nature and effect of police
officer mistakes of law on the Fourth Amendment right and the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule remedy. I explain the approach,
and, in Part III, show why it can solve the problems described in the
previous Parts and defend the approach against potential objections.

11. See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment,
68 U. MIA. L. REV. 589, 619 (2014) (questioning the Court’s Herring analysis finding a search to be
both reasonable and unreasonable).
12. See generally Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564 n.6 (1971) (treating the exclusionary
rule as part of the Fourth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (finding the
exclusionary rule to be a critical component of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
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I. FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS AND EXCLUSION
This Part charts the origins and development of the Court’s
Fourth Amendment reasonableness and exclusion doctrine throughout
criminal procedure case law. Section A embeds the doctrine within the
text of the Fourth Amendment. Section B surveys the development of
the exclusionary rule and its corollary good faith exception doctrine
from their first judicial recognition by the Court through to the present
day. Section C traces and critiques the exclusionary rule’s doctrinal
shift from its original constitutional foundation to a distinct analysis
detached from it.
A. Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of individuals to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and establishes
a specificity requirement that the issuance of warrants be supported by
probable cause. 13 The language of the Fourth Amendment is both terse
and ambiguous, leaving key terms, including the standard of
reasonableness, and their relationship to the dual clauses of the
Amendment itself open to interpretation. 14 The Court has consistently
emphasized that reasonableness represents the “touchstone” of the
Fourth Amendment and the measure of both the permissibility of the
decision to search or seize as well as the scope of the intrusive actions
on the part of the government that follow this decision. 15 Attempts to
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
14. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 42–43 (1966) (noting a lack of clarity in the Fourth Amendment
and three possible interpretations of the term “unreasonable”); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762–81 (1994) (analyzing historical
interpretations of the Warrant Clause); Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, but Opening Old
Wounds in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 603–10 (1986)
(addressing the Framers’ intents in composing the Fourth Amendment); Morgan Cloud, Searching
Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1721–31 (1996) (supporting a
conjunctive theory interpretation of the Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness Clause); Martin
Grayson, The Warrant Clause in Historical Context, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 107, 114–19 (1987)
(exploring contemporary grammar and interpretation of the Warrant Clause at time of framing);
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Fourth Amendment’s Two Clauses, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389, 1394–96
(1989) (questioning how courts should interpret the Fourth Amendment as founders intended in
the modern era).
15. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843,
855 n.4 (2006)) (supporting the notion that reasonableness rather than individual suspicion is the
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interpret and apply the Fourth Amendment in the frequently litigated
cases of searches and seizures have generated a voluminous body of
legal doctrine. 16
The Court’s doctrinal development of the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard started from the text of the Fourth
Amendment and has relied heavily on the structural idiosyncrasy of its
two clauses. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 17

The interpretation of these two grammatically independent but
connected clauses 18 was the emphasis of the Court’s initial Fourth
Amendment cases. 19 The first clause, also known as the Reasonableness
Clause, stipulates that all searches and seizures must be reasonable.
The second clause, known commonly as the Warrant Clause, requires

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment); see, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)
(reaffirming reasonableness as the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment); United States v.
Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (recognizing reasonableness as the touchstone in Fourth
Amendment analysis as well as warrant execution); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184–86
(1990) (discussing reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment in each stage of a search
and seizure); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) (questioning reasonableness standards
in mistake-of-identity arrests); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985) (noting that
reasonableness is the “fundamental command” of the Fourth Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 19–20 (1968) (emphasizing that reasonableness remains central to Fourth Amendment analysis
and applies in stop-and-frisk cases).
16. See Gretchan R. Diffendal, Note, Application of the Good-Faith Exception in Instances of
a Predicate Illegal Search: “Reasonable” Means Around the Exclusionary Rule?, 68 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 217, 220–23 (1994) (exploring the historical origins of the confusion and interpretation
differences).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. For a summary of the principal views on the relationship of the two clauses, see Thomas
K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and
Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 517–25 (1995); and James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo:
The Walls Close in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1123–36 (1992). See
also Wasserstrom, supra note 14, at 1389 (noting ambiguity in the relationship between the
clauses of the Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A
Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1997) (analyzing the Court’s contrasting analytical
models, which view the clauses as both independent and interdependent).
19. See Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933) (holding probable cause, not
merely oath of belief, is necessary for issuance of a search warrant); Grau v. United States, 287
U.S. 124, 128–29 (1932) (finding affidavit contained an insufficient statement of probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the search warrant was invalid); Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) (holding failure to obtain a warrant before searching a garage, despite
opportunity to search, necessitated suppression of evidence); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 31 (1925) (noting warrantless seizure of the home was firmly held unconstitutional); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (holding when under “implied coercion,” police cannot
search a house without a warrant); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 399 (1914) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause applies to search of letter in mail).
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that the government have a warrant supported by probable cause and
of sufficient specificity before a search or seizure can occur.
The Court’s first take on the Reasonableness Clause during the
early Fourth Amendment cases construed the clause as contingent on
the Warrant Clause: a search is reasonable if it is in line with the
guarantees set out in the Warrant Clause. 20 Generally, searches and
seizures are presumed unreasonable and thus unconstitutional in the
absence of a warrant supported by probable cause. 21 A police officer who
enters a home without a warrant performs an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 22 Since the Court articulated this
initial framework, it has used different models at different times to
assess the reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Thomas Clancy identifies at least five such models: 23 the
warrant presumption model, 24 the individualized suspicion model, 25 the

20. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 14, at 43 (highlighting the ambiguity of the Fourth
Amendment’s text); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (clarifying the requirement for the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause
to be analyzed as a pair); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963) (“It is basic that an
arrest with or without a warrant must stand upon firmer ground than mere suspicion.”); Richard
M. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCI. 393, 401 (1963) (noting a reasonable search under the Reasonableness Clause complies with
the requirements of the Warrant Clause); BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 12 (1986) (suggesting that the Founders intended the
Warrant Clause as rubric for legal seizure under the Reasonableness Clause).
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that searches outside judicial
process are per se unreasonable, subject to few exceptions).
22. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61 (2014) (noting that vehicle seizures require
“reasonable suspicion” of a crime as justification); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136
(2009) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment justification requirement to be in form of warrant
or probable cause).
23. Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L.
REV. 977, 978.
24. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2533–34 (2019) (holding that a
warrantless search was allowed with compelling need for official action and no time to secure
warrant, in context of securing additional BAC testing); City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409,
419 (2015) (finding that warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable); Fernandez v. California,
571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014) (noting that a warrant is usually necessary for constitutional seizure
despite exceptions); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (supporting warrant
requirement for search to be reasonable); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454
(1971) (recognizing that slight deviations from the warrant requirement open the floodgates to
unconstitutional searches); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (upholding the need for judicial involvement in
the search process).
25. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949) (finding that officers who have
substantial ground to believe a crime has occurred can stop an individual without a warrant); see
also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) (recognizing that a warrantless search may
be justified when an officer has met the objective suspicion criteria).
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totality of the circumstances test, 26 the balancing test, 27 and a hybrid
model based on common law originalism. 28
Courts now largely approach the reasonableness standard
through an objective assessment of factors like the degree of intrusion
by the search or seizure and the manner in which a search or seizure is
conducted, examining the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the search or seizure was constitutional. 29 Largely, the
reasonableness of a search turns on an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy against government intrusion. 30 The
reasonableness of a seizure turns on whether there was a basis to seize
a person outweighing the interest of privacy. 31 The reasonableness of a
stop and frisk requires reasonable suspicion that the person is engaging
in criminal activity and/or is armed and dangerous for the police to
justify the intrusion into privacy. 32 The reasonableness of probable
cause turns on a sufficient belief that the police will find evidence of

26. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2002) (noting that the “proper
inquiry” necessitates consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter” (quoting
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991))); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)) (discussing that proper application of the Fourth
Amendment requires an analysis of the specific circumstances of the case); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (requiring that judges use a “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis” in
assessing probable cause); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950), overruled in part
by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (stating that there is no fixed test for
reasonableness and the totality of circumstances must be analyzed to determine reasonableness).
27. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999)) (utilizing a balancing approach to determine reasonableness under
Fourth Amendment analysis); Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (affirming the
need for reasonableness in balancing of interests); see also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373
(1959) (recognizing the need to balance state and individual interests); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27–33 (1949) (recognizing the need to weigh an individual’s right to privacy with the risk of the
exclusionary rule).
28. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299–301 (utilizing a reasonableness balancing standard while
incorporating the intention of the Framers); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and
Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1760 (2000) (describing Houghton as adopting “new
Fourth Amendment originalism”).
29. See Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2020) (noting that the Fourth Amendment
analysis requires a view of totality of the circumstances); Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848
(2006) (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19) (discussing the balancing of the “individual’s privacy”
with “legitimate governmental interests”). Earlier cases have cleared the way for this
understanding of special need cases. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985)
(analyzing whether the Warrant Clause applies to public school officials).
30. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (noting that reasonableness is the
proper inquiry whether the search took place in “a home, an office, or a hotel”).
31. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434–35 (recognizing that a conversation initiated by a police
officer does not constitute a seizure); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 559–60 (1980)
(holding that an individual’s consent for search negates possible Fourth Amendment violation).
32. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 72–73 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating reasonable suspicion standard).
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criminal activity through a search. 33 Courts endeavor to balance the
degree of intrusion upon individuals’ rights to privacy against
government interests, taking into account any special needs and
exigent circumstances. 34
The doctrinal development of these overlapping and yet distinct
reasonableness models, however, has created confusion and favored
selective application of whichever model courts find most fits to assess
the constitutionality of a search or seizure. This uncertainty, in turn,
has bred contempt for Fourth Amendment doctrine. 35 The Court has not
only done little to establish some sort of coherence that could guide
lower courts but has seemed to favor this type of fragmented and
haphazard doctrinal development. 36 In the face of these challenges,
Brandon Garrett has viewed reasonableness as a fragmented concept
that addresses three areas relating to Fourth Amendment doctrine:
(1) the nature of the mental element under notions of subjective or
objective reasonableness; (2) the object of the reasonableness inquiry
such as that of an average person or a person in the same situation as
the one in question; and finally (3) the identification of distinct
categories of circumstances, each of which carries an individualized
reasonableness assessment with its own limits or exceptions to the
general rule. 37 Akhil Amar, on the other hand, has argued
reasonableness is, in fact, a unifying force that can bring coherence to
the Fourth Amendment and resolve the fragmented nature of existing
doctrine. 38

33. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 175 (1949)) (explaining that probable cause relies on suspicion of guilt); see also Kit
Kinports, Diminishing Probable Cause and Minimalist Searches, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 649, 660
(2009) (opining that the Court risks conflating probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards
in its reasonableness analysis).
34. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the privacy afforded to a
person depends on whether the person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and whether that
expectation is one that society deems reasonable); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979) (adopting Harlan’s formulation from Katz).
35. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 11, at 618 (critiquing the doctrine for confusing the
Fourth Amendment right with a remedy).
36. See id. (noting how two reasonableness standards risk constraining the Fourth
Amendment and infringing upon individual liberty).
37. Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L. REV. 61, 99–100 (2017).
38. See Amar, supra note 14, at 759 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment generally requires
reasonableness).
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B. Reasonableness Within the Exclusionary Rule
The language of the Fourth Amendment does not directly
prescribe a remedy for instances where the government violates the
rights it guarantees. In establishing a remedy, the Court has adopted
the exclusionary rule, a remedy that provides for suppression of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 39 Despite its
long-standing existence, this doctrine remains one of the most
controversial and fragmented in criminal and constitutional
jurisprudence. 40
For most of its history, the exclusionary rule served as an
automatic remedy to Fourth Amendment violations, irrespective of any
assessment of police officers’ reasonableness based on the officers’
beliefs regarding the legality of their actions. 41 In Weeks v. United
States and Mapp v. Ohio, the Court required the suppression of
unlawfully obtained evidence because admission of such evidence would
undermine the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment and
would reduce it to a “form of words” 42 of “no value.” 43 Nevertheless, in
subsequent decades, the Court has steadily constricted the exclusionary
rule remedy both in terms of its scope and its manner of application 44
in what has often been described as a sustained “legal assault” against
the doctrine. 45 The Court shifted away from the reflexive approach of
39. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961) (adopting the federal exclusionary rule).
40. Sabina Veneziano, Examining the Modern Use of the Exclusionary Rule and the Danger
of Its Expansion, 55 GONZ. L. REV. 73, 75 (2020).
41. For the most significant case, see Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656–57, where the court applies the
exclusionary rule to state violations of the Fourth Amendment. See also Kamin & Marceau, supra
note 11, at 627 (criticizing the Court’s reliance on precedent in Fourth Amendment cases);
Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1971) (applying the exclusionary rule in a case with an
insufficient warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (applying the exclusionary
rule to a telephone conversation listened to without a warrant).
42. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920); see Mapp, 367 U.S.
at 657 (suppressing a forced confession for fear of convicting an innocent man).
43. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
44. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2011) (holding the exclusionary rule
does not apply when searches are conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
precedent); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) (noting that suppression is not an
automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591
(2006) (declaring that the Court has rejected broad application of the exclusionary rule); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907–08 (1984) (limiting the application of the exclusionary rule to
situations where its use is appropriate in terms of a cost-benefit analysis); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding the exclusionary rule should only be applied when
exclusion will deter misconduct).
45. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New Exclusionary
Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 624 (2014); see Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 85–93 (1984)
(providing an overview of cases narrowing the exclusionary rule); Craig M. Bradley, Reconceiving
the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 229 (2010)
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prior cases where they treated Fourth Amendment violations as
synonymous with evidence suppression. 46 Ultimately, this resulted in
the Court significantly altering their understanding of the relationship
between substantive Fourth Amendment violations and the
exclusionary rule remedy. The Court separated the question of
substantive Fourth Amendment violation from the question of evidence
suppression and grounded the exclusionary rule on the policy of
deterring future police misconduct. 47 In other words, a constitutional
violation is a necessary but not a sole or sufficient condition for the
application of the exclusionary rule. 48
As a result of these developments, the Court now consistently
understands the exclusionary rule not as an individual remedy
stemming directly from Fourth Amendment protections but as a
prophylactic remedy created to deter future Fourth Amendment
violations. 49 The Court has repeatedly affirmed that the Fourth
Amendment only prohibits unconstitutional searches and not the
admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial. 50 The
[hereinafter Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment] (suggesting that the Court intends to
reconsider exclusionary rule). Scholars have systematically critiqued the Court’s reasoning behind
this line of decisions. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a
Shark?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 501–07, 510–11 (2009) (describing the history of the
exclusionary rule, beginning before the Revolutionary War); Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin,
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 66 (2016) (noting the Court’s decision to excise reasonableness from
Terry test); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Court’s Latest Assault on the
Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009) (critiquing the Court’s decision
in Herring for complicating Fourth Amendment analyses); David Alan Sklansky, Lecture, Is the
Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 578–79 (2008) (discussing the ongoing
informal reforms in police departments); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 848 (1994) (arguing for modernized interpretation of what constitutes
reasonableness under Fourth Amendment); James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the
Future of Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819, 1832–33, 1848–49, 1880–81 (2008)
(describing a variety of interpretations lower courts can make in response to the Court’s ruling in
Hudson); Craig M. Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary Rule?, TRIAL, Apr. 2009,
at 53 (noting the difficulty in applying Herring to a broad collection of cases).
46. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568–69 (1971); see Davis, 564 U.S. at 242–43 (rejecting
the argument that the exclusionary rule is a retroactivity issue and not a good faith issue).
47. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137; Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 466–67 (1976); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347–48; see Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592 (2006) (noting that courts cannot apply the exclusionary rule to a
Fourth Amendment violation solely because the violation is a “but-for” cause of evidence
collection); Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–37 (holding the sole purpose of exclusion is to deter misconduct).
48. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591–92.
49. Stone, 428 U.S. at 486; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348; see Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp
v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-andSeizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1394–97 (1983).
50. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment is distinct from
the exclusionary rule); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1774 (1991) (“Because any
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exclusionary rule no longer enjoys blanket application. 51 Rather, it is
based on a series of categorical or case-by-case exceptions, 52 reflecting
the Court’s goal of balancing the costs and benefits of evidence
suppression—the cost of setting potentially guilty people free without
punishment, and the benefit of deterring future constitutional
violations. 53 By introducing these various exceptions, the Court has
aimed to delineate the types of circumstances or cases where
suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
will help deter other police officers from violating the Fourth
Amendment in future cases. 54
This deterrence rationale generated a line of doctrine where the
Court introduced circumstances that bar the application of the
exclusionary rule by treating police culpability as a proxy for
anticipating deterrent effect. In one of these lines of doctrine, the Court
looks at whether the actions of the police officer were in sufficiently
reasonable “good faith” reliance on the law, introducing a standard of
reasonableness that controls the application of the exclusionary rule
distinct from the standard of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment. 55 The Court has ruled, in ample variations of this
violation of the Constitution occurred in the past, outside of court, admission of the evidence is not
an independent violation.”).
51. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348–49 (noting the exclusionary rule should only be utilized if
exclusion meets a balancing test).
52. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 920–21 (noting that the good faith exception does not interfere
with the deterrence goal); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (recognizing the inevitable
discovery doctrine); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (utilizing the attenuation
or causation exception); see also Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 656 (2011) (suggesting the difficulty in applying various standards
of exclusionary rule has caused its erosion).
53. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 897–98, 906–08 (holding the exclusionary rule should be utilized
only when benefits of exclusion outweigh costs of exclusion); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347–48
(discussing the need to balance the deterrent effects of exclusion with the potential impediment of
the jury); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (finding that evidence seized illegally
by state officials admitted in federal civil proceedings was allowable because likelihood of deterring
police misconduct did not outweigh substantial social costs); see also Davis v. United States, 564
U.S. 229, 237–38 (2011) (noting that exclusion should be utilized where deterrent purpose is
served); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (finding the exclusionary rule applied in
cases where its remedial function outweighs potential costs). Contra Stewart, supra note 49, at
1383 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))
(suggesting that government overintervention harms society more than free criminals).
54. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–37 (finding the exclusionary rule is intended to compel respect
for Fourth Amendment rights); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (noting the primary purpose of
exclusionary rule is to deter misconduct); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (citing United
States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930)) (detailing that the deterrent purpose of the
exclusionary rule implies inherent limits to searches).
55. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (holding that police misconduct
must be deliberate and systemic to justify cost of exclusionary rule); Davis, 564 U.S. at 238–39
(holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when there is reasonable police reliance on
warrant).
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standard, that the deterrent value of evidence suppression outweighs
its costs at times when a police officer exhibits “deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent” disregard for Fourth Amendment rights. 56 But, when
the police act with an “objectively reasonable good-faith belief” in the
legality of their conduct, 57 or when their conduct “involves only simple,
isolated negligence,” 58 the deterrence rationale carries less weight, and
exclusion “cannot pay its way.” 59 In essence, the Court has established
a series of micro-standards intended to define and elaborate on what
the Court meant when they spoke of an “objectively reasonable good
faith belief” that obviates the need for exclusion. But even the Court
has come to identify “good faith” as a misnomer that has engendered
several problems. 60
In United States v. Leon, the case in which the Court established
this “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule, 61 the Court found
that evidence seized on the basis of a mistakenly issued search warrant
does not need to be excluded at trial. 62 The Court reasoned that if a
police officer mistakenly relied on what the officer thought was a valid
arrest warrant approved by a magistrate, exclusion will not serve any
deterrent function for other police officers’ reliance on similar
warrants. 63 The Court after Leon went on to apply this good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in a series of other circumstances. In
56. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
57. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 901–02; Herring, 555 U.S. at 137–38.
58. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137.
59. Id.; Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (2011).
60. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 142–43 (noting that in Leon, the Court conflated reasonable
reliance with good faith); Re, supra note 9, at 1942–44 (discussing the good faith exception’s ability
to allow a constitutional infringement of liberty); Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the
Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1103 (2011) (analyzing how good faith conflates
a subjective standard with an objective standard of cost benefit analysis).
61. 468 U.S. at 922–23.
62. Id. at 925–26.
63. See id. at 899, 904, 916–17, 923 (holding the exclusionary rule would not have general
deterrent effect on individuals). The Court in Leon went on to sketch at least four instances in
which evidence suppression is not inappropriate when police have obtained a warrant and acted
in accordance with it, including (1) when a warrant issued is based upon an affidavit containing
information that an officer knows or should know is false, (2) when an affidavit includes so little
indicia of probable cause that official belief in it is unreasonable, (3) when the warrant is so facially
deficient that the executing officer cannot reasonably believe it to be valid, and (4) when the issuing
judge has completely abandoned her objective judicial role in issuing the warrant. Id.; Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155 (1978) (holding false statements included in affidavit to find probable
cause warranted hearing); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610–11 (1970) (Powell, J., concurring in
part). But see Leon, 468 U.S. at 934–35 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over the
holding’s threat to fundamental rights); Nirej Sekhon, Dangerous Warrants, 93 WASH. L. REV. 967,
982 (2018) (suggesting support for limiting exclusionary rule in cases of ambiguous deterrent
effect).
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Illinois v. Krull, the Court held a police officer’s actions after relying on
a statute that was later declared to be unconstitutional did not warrant
the application of the exclusionary rule. 64 The Court found that law
enforcement officials cannot be expected to question the legislature
responsible for passing the law, and suppression of evidence in this type
of police activity would have little deterrent effect. 65 In Arizona v.
Evans, the police made a warrantless search relying on a computer
record that erroneously showed an outstanding warrant due to a court
clerk’s failure to update the database to reflect that the warrant had
been quashed. 66 The Court held the exclusionary rule was not
warranted, as there was no reason for the arresting officer to know the
warrant was no longer valid. 67
In Herring v. United States, a police officer performed a search
on the basis of a warrant from the neighboring county’s police
department database that had been recalled, but the recall was never
entered into the system due to a clerical mistake. 68 The Court reiterated
the language used in Leon regarding the necessary balancing between
suppression of evidence on the one hand and deterrent effect on police
misconduct on the other. 69 However, the Court added a new threshold
to this balancing test in order to determine the extent to which
deterrence justifies the exclusionary rule, by assessing the police
officer’s culpability. 70 According to the Court, exclusion supports the
goal of deterrence when the police conduct is “deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent [ ] or in some circumstances recurring or systemic
negligence.” 71 Thus, the culpability of the officer becomes a proxy for
establishing the rule’s potential deterrent impact on police. 72 In other
words, for the application of the exclusionary rule, the police’s action
64. 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987).
65. Id. at 349.
66. 514 U.S. 1, 5 (1995).
67. Id. at 15–16.
68. 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009).
69. Id. at 147.
70. Id. at 143. In the wake of Herring, one leading commentator published an article
straightforwardly entitled: “Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?” Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary
Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2012). Another prominent title states: “No More
Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule.” Tracey Maclin & Jennifer Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe
to Take Out the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L.J. 1183, 1186 (2012).
Meanwhile, a leading Fourth Amendment treatise writer called Herring “a complete disaster” and
“scary.” LaFave, supra note 45, at 770, 787; see also TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 346–47 (2012) (arguing that Hudson and
Herring contributed to “[a]brogation of the exclusionary rule” during the Roberts Court); Alschuler,
supra note 45, at 501–07, 510–11 (warning of Herring’s threat to the exclusionary rule).
71. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
72. Id. at 143.
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must meet a certain standard of deliberate conduct so that exclusion
can meaningfully deter it, and it must also be sufficiently culpable to
justify the price of suppressing potentially inculpatory evidence. 73 And
because the clerical error in the police database appeared to be an
isolated negligent mistake, there was no need to suppress the evidence
found on Herring. 74
The Court broadened the categories of cases in which it has
applied the “good faith exception” in Davis v. United States. In Davis,
the police had searched Davis’s car based on precedent permitting
searches of the passenger compartment when arresting a person in a
vehicle. 75 Davis’s case was on appeal when the Court overturned this
precedent. 76 However, the Court found the police officer had acted with
an objectively reasonable good faith belief that his conduct was lawful
under the original precedent. 77 As this was simply a situation of an
isolated mistake, evidence suppression would have no meaningful
deterrent effect, according to the Court. 78
Reasonableness as a standard for police reliance on the law in
the context of evidence suppression has turned into an assessment of
objective police culpability. In the series of “good faith exception” cases,
when dealing with police mistakes of law, the reasonableness
assessment only tips against the police conduct when it is “deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent,” or is due to “recurring or systematic
negligence,” for the purpose of excluding evidence. 79 This culpability
standard has repeatedly confused lower courts, which engage in an
assessment of the subjective mental state of police officers, even though
the Court has declared that the test is one of objective culpability. 80
73. Id. at 143–46.
74. Id. at 134–47.
75. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 235 (2011).
76. Id. at 249–50; see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 352 (2009) (holding that police may only
search a car incident to arrest if arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of car at the
time of the search); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding that a change of rule
in criminal proceedings must apply retroactively to all federal and states cases pending review or
not closed).
77. Davis, 564 U.S. at 241.
78. Id. at 240–41.
79. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921–22 (1984)
(recognizing that a warrant obtained in good faith and followed in its scope leaves little for a court
to deter); Davis, 564 U.S at 249–50 (holding that reasonable reliance on precedent is insufficient
to activate the exclusionary rule).
80. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating that subjective intent
is irrelevant in Fourth Amendment analysis); Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling For Herring: Lessons
in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 727 (2011) (exploring the
Court’s choice to elevate culpability to a critical question in Herring when it is usually rooted in
tort law); Alschuler, supra note 45, at 483–84 (explaining the Court’s shift for qualified immunity
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C. The Critique of the Current Doctrine
Taken together, the “good faith exception” doctrine represents
not just a fundamental shift in the Court’s construction of the
exclusionary rule but also an ideological stance on the Fourth
Amendment’s doctrinal development. The Court’s compulsion to
overcorrect a low threshold for exclusion of evidence by emphasizing the
nature of the exclusionary rule as a remedy distinct from the letter of
the Fourth Amendment has caused judges to be rather hesitant in
drawing any meaningful connections between the Court’s Fourth
Amendment doctrine and the exclusionary rule. 81 The Court has moved
from the obvious and automatic exclusionary remedy to a much more
restricted remedy reserved for egregious police culpability under a new
reasonableness standard disconnected from the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard. 82 The Court has repeatedly affirmed that the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness” 83
but has not established a solid framework on how reasonableness
factors into Fourth Amendment exclusion. Instead, the Court’s
reasonableness analysis both as a matter of right and also as a matter
of remedy has continuously changed with each new case, generating a
disjointed parade of positions on what constitutes an unreasonable
search or seizure worthy of evidence suppression. 84
From Leon up to Davis, the Court largely engaged in a two-part
inquiry. First, was the search or seizure unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment? Second, did the level of police culpability render the
search or seizure nonetheless sufficiently reasonable, grounded on the
policy goal of police misconduct deterrence? 85 This approach has
from a partly subjective to a purely objective standard over time); LaFave, supra note 45, at 784
(arguing that the Court conflated gross negligence with recklessness in Herring); Ferguson, supra
note 45, at 639 (expressing concern over how criminal courts will interpret traditionally civil
standards in exclusionary rule analysis); Eang L. Ngov, Police Ignorance and Mistake of Law
Under the Fourth Amendment, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 165, 170–71 (2018) (discussing the nature
of mistake of law under criminal law and its incompatibility with the holding in Heien).
81. Leading constitutional law scholarship as well as jurisprudence seek to sharply separate
what they consider to be the superior realm of constitutional rights from the inferior realm of
remedies. This right/remedy distinction in constitutional law serves to maintain the purity of
constitutional rights from the more pragmatic, policy-oriented goals of remedies. This Article
indirectly engages with this debate in Part III, infra.
82. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967) (holding that searches committed
without judicial review are per se unreasonable).
83. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014); Davis, 564 U.S. at 238–39; Kansas v.
Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2020); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014).
84. See Clancy, supra note 23, at 978 (suggesting that the Court chooses from judicially
created models to apply on case-by-case basis).
85. See Davis, 564 U.S. at 238–39 (noting the importance of determining reasonableness and
ensuring deterrence from future Fourth Amendment violations); Herring v. United States, 555
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employed two different analytical frameworks for reasonableness: one
that evaluates the balance between individuals’ expectations of privacy
versus the government’s interests in security to assess the
reasonableness of a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment,
and a second that balances the general deterrence costs and benefits of
applying the exclusionary rule from the standpoint of police
culpability. 86 The outcomes indicate that the Court considers the costs
of exclusion to be so great that it is only justifiable in cases where the
corresponding general deterrence benefit of police misconduct is even
greater, even when the first part of the inquiry finds an unreasonable
and therefore unconstitutional search or seizure. 87
In so doing, the Court has established two distinct standards of
reasonableness: one for more substantive Fourth Amendment questions
and another for more procedural exclusionary rule questions. Under
these two standards, a search can be sufficiently unreasonable to
trigger a Fourth Amendment violation but not unreasonable enough to
trigger the exclusionary rule. 88 As a consequence, interpretations of
reasonableness have migrated from questions of substantive Fourth
Amendment rights—whether the search and seizure was reasonable
under constitutional standards—to an additional separate question of
remedy—whether the violation was reasonable enough to bar
application of the exclusionary rule at trial. 89 This shift has occurred
without analysis or elaboration on the distinct elements of each
reasonableness standard, or attention to whether these two inquiries
are always bound to be distinct. 90

U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (indicating that there are two parts: determining if the Fourth Amendment
was violated and then determining if the exclusionary rule applies); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (holding that courts may leave flexibility in the factors used in the two-step
inquiry).
86. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 11, at 601–02 (noting inequality between the two
reasonableness tests); Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 591, 626–27 (2016) (analyzing the uncertainty two reasonableness tests create and
suggesting that the Court seeks a cost effective method to achieve greatest enforcement of law);
LaFave, supra note 45, at 761 (examining the Court’s varying approaches to cost benefit analysis).
87. See Kerr, supra note 86, at 629–30 (examining the economic balancing approach the Court
utilizes in exclusionary rule cases).
88. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 659 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (objecting
to a “double standard of reasonableness” in the Fourth Amendment qualified-immunity context).
89. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 11, at 590–91 (highlighting double reasonableness as
a cause of the Fourth Amendment’s remedial focus); Garrett, supra note 37, at 81 (highlighting
reasonableness as a constitutional remedy rather than element of criminal procedure).
90. See Re, supra note 9, at 1942 (suggesting that good faith cases are displaced Fourth
Amendment holdings rather than exclusionary rule cases).
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II. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION CASES ARE DISPLACED FOURTH
AMENDMENT HOLDINGS
As the previous Part made clear, the Fourth Amendment
exclusion doctrine is a confusing morass that includes two strands of
analogous but distinct sets of reasonableness standards. But I argue
that after the Court’s decision in Heien v. North Carolina, the
boundaries between these two doctrinal strands have blurred so much
that some good faith exceptions may, in fact, be decided as Fourth
Amendment cases, rendering the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule redundant in cases of alleged mistakes of law.
A. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Is Redundant
The latest relevant Fourth Amendment decision from the Court
in Heien alters the way we can approach questions that courts have
traditionally viewed as relating to the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. 91 Heien is similar to the strand of “good faith
exception” cases, but it is different in one important respect: in those
cases, the Court had already assumed that a Fourth Amendment
violation had taken place. 92 Thus, the Court’s inquiry was restricted to
the remedy of evidence suppression. 93 In Heien, the question of a Fourth
Amendment violation was on the table. A police officer mistakenly
believed North Carolina law required two working brake lights and
stopped the car in which Heien was a passenger because one brake light
was out. 94 The officer searched the vehicle and discovered contraband. 95
At trial, Heien filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered during
the search, which the trial court denied. 96 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed this decision, finding the traffic stop was not
reasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment because no traffic
violation occurred under state law. 97 The North Carolina Supreme
91. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 68 (2014) (holding that officer’s mistake of law
was reasonable).
92. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011) (noting the presence of exclusionary
rule); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–360 (1987) (highlighting the presence of exclusionary
rule).
93. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 65–66 (noting that prior Fourth Amendment cases confirmed
violations and were limited to remedial actions). Many have criticized the Court’s reluctance to
take on the substantive questions of Fourth Amendment rights and tendency to resort instead to
the narrower question of exclusionary rule remedy. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 11, at 619
(questioning the Court’s focus on exclusion as remedy).
94. Heien, 574 U.S. at 58.
95. Id.
96. State v. Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827, 828 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
97. Id. at 829–31.
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Court reversed and held that a police officer’s reasonable mistake of law
can give rise to the reasonable suspicion required for a traffic stop
complying with the demands of the Fourth Amendment. 98 The U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed. 99
Heien presented the question of whether it was reasonable for a
police officer to suspect the defendant’s conduct was illegal on the basis
of a mistaken understanding of a statute, or, in other words, whether
the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic
stop can rest on a mistake of law, 100 rendering the search reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 101 The Court found exactly that by
explicitly stating the Fourth Amendment standard requires
reasonableness, but “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect.” 102
Therefore, searches based on mistakes of law can be reasonable because
it is possible for reasonable police officers to make reasonable mistakes
of law. 103 The Court undertook this analysis by setting Heien apart from
its earlier “good faith exception,” which it categorized as dealing
specifically with mistakes of law in the context of the exclusionary
rule. 104 Interestingly, the Court in Heien was inadvertently forced to
undertake this approach because North Carolina does not recognize the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 105 This analysis was
98. State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (N.C. 2012).
99. Heien, 574 U.S. at 76.
100. Id. at 65–66.
101. See Lael Weinberger, Making Mistakes About the Law: Police Mistakes of Law Between
Qualified Immunity and Lenity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1561, 1568 (2017) (noting the Heien majority’s
reliance on Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)).
102. Heien, 574 U.S. at 60 (explaining that the core of Fourth Amendment includes
reasonableness).
103. Id. at 61.
104. Id. at 66.
105. Thirteen states have declined to provide a good faith exception for mistakes of law. See
State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58, 59 (Conn. 1990) (declining to adopt the Leon holding on the state
level); Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 814, 821 (Del. 2000) (refusing to lower Delaware
Constitution’s probable cause standard); Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 430 (Ga. 1992), abrogated
by Mobley v. State, 834 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 2019) (leaving decision to adopt Leon’s standard to state
legislature); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 677 (Idaho 1992) (expressing concerns over adopting
good faith exception articulated in Leon); State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 292–93 (Iowa 2000),
abrogated on other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2001) (disagreeing with the
Court’s cost-benefit analysis in Leon); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 554 n.5 (Mass.
1985) (upholding state statute that prevented courts from assessing whether to admit evidence
discovered without probable cause); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097, 1102 (N.H. 1995) (finding the
good faith exception is inconsistent with state constitutional provisions); State v. Johnson, 775
A.2d 1273, 1281–82 (N.J. 2001) (refusing to adopt good faith exception); State v. Gutierrez, 863
P.2d 1052, 1053 (N.M. 1993) (finding the good faith exception incompatible with Constitution of
New Mexico); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451, 457–58 (N.Y. 1985) (declining to adopt good faith
exception from Leon); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 888 (Pa. 1991) (declining to adopt
good faith exception); State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 121 (Vt. 1991) (declining to adopt good faith
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unlike past cases where the Court framed its holdings in terms of the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because the parties had
already conceded the existence of a Fourth Amendment violation, a
concession that muddied the Court’s approach. 106
But since the Court has now accepted that the reasonableness of
a mistaken belief that triggers constitutionally questionable conduct is
relevant to the evaluation of conduct under the Fourth Amendment,
why does the Court have to make a second assessment for the
reasonableness of that same mistake at the exclusionary rule stage?
There is no need for a “reasonableness” exception to the exclusionary
rule when that rule kicks in only after the Court determines the conduct
violates the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” requirement. 107 If
we consider the “good faith exception” strand of exclusionary rule
doctrine in the light of Heien, it becomes redundant in many categories
of cases. If an officer’s reliance on a statute is sufficiently reasonable to
establish reasonable suspicion, it is now compliant with the Fourth
Amendment even if this reliance ultimately turns out to be in error.
This reasonable mistake triggers no question of evidence suppression.
If, however, the police’s mistake of law is unreasonable so that the
search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, this original
assessment that the mistaken reliance on the law was constitutionally
unreasonable also answers the question of reasonableness for the
purposes of the exclusionary rule. This is so especially since the two
standards for what constitutes a reasonable mistake of law—as a
matter of Fourth Amendment right and exclusion remedy—are
objective and thus overlap. Instead of ruling that the exclusionary rule
does or does not apply in one instance or another, courts in these good
faith exclusionary rule cases can simply hold that an unreasonable
search did or did not take place at all. Thus, certain good faith
exclusionary rule categories of cases can now be best understood not as
decisions that involve the exclusionary rule but rather as Fourth
Amendment holdings.

exception established in Leon); State v. Afana, 233 P.3d 879, 886 (Wash. 2010) (holding good faith
exception inconsistent with state constitution); People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604, 612 (Ill. 1996)
(declining to adopt Court’s good faith exception as articulated in Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340
(1987)).
106. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (noting the presence of a
Fourth Amendment violation before proceeding to the exclusionary rule analysis); Davis v. United
States, 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011) (same).
107. Richard Re first raised this point in “The Due Process Exclusionary Rule.” See Re, supra
note 9, at 1943 (observing that there is no need for “a ‘reasonableness’ exception to the exclusionary
rule, when that rule comes into play only after a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s
‘reasonableness’ requirement”).
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After Heien, it is difficult to understand the rationale behind
reassessing reasonableness in the context of evidence suppression after
the constitutional assessment when the “ultimate touchstone” of the
Fourth Amendment is, according to the Court, reasonableness. 108 In
practice, an inquiry stemming from a questionable search or seizure
begins by first assessing the reasonableness of this search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment through establishing the balance
between government interests and individual privacy interests. 109 In
the instances where the police have acted under mistaken beliefs about
the law, if the mistake of law is reasonable, then it weighs on the side
of the government’s interests. This does not mean that individuals have
less of a right to privacy where there is a reasonable mistake of law but
rather that the government retains its interest in the search or seizure
to the extent the officer’s mistaken belief about the legality of the search
or seizure is reasonable. But, if the police officer’s mistake of law is
unreasonable, the government does not retain the same interest in law
enforcement. In these circumstances, the weight tips towards the
individual’s privacy interests. The officer acting on an unreasonable
mistake of law violates the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights,
which triggers the question of whether the exclusionary rule remedy
applies.
Stated differently, when a court engages in questions of the
Fourth Amendment in instances where the police have been mistaken
about the law, the court is asking whether a police officer engaged in
activity that implicates the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether the
officer’s actions comply with the dictates of the constitutional
108. See Heien, 574 U.S. at 66 (holding that reasonableness is the conclusive barometer of the
Fourth Amendment); Davis, 564 U.S. at 237–38 (evaluating Fourth Amendment claim under a
reasonableness standard); Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188–89 (2020) (basing analysis of
Fourth Amendment violation on reasonableness); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381–82 (2014)
(centering Fourth Amendment violation analysis around reasonableness); Brigham City v. Stuart,
547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (holding that “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
‘reasonableness’ ”); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (reaffirming the base Fourth
Amendment reasonableness principle); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016)
(finding that the Fourth Amendment’s foundation is based on reasonableness); Karen McDonald
Henning, “Reasonable” Police Mistakes: Fourth Amendment Claims and the “Good Faith”
Exception After Heien, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 271, 321–22 (2016) (explaining that Fourth
Amendment “reasonableness” encompasses mistakes of law and mistakes of fact for officers).
109. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461 (2013) (noting that DNA collection in course of
legitimate government interest is not an invasion of individual privacy under the balancing test);
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118 (2001)) (holding that reasonableness is determined by balancing need for individual privacy
and investigation of government interests); Knights, 534 U.S. at 118–19 (quoting Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)) (determining that reasonableness depends on a balancing test);
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (finding that traditional standards of
reasonableness depend upon a balancing test of individual privacy and government interests).
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reasonableness requirement, including a determination on the objective
reasonableness of the police mistake of law. If, in the question of
remedies, as the Court tells us, the only reason we exclude evidence
from criminal trials is to deter police from egregious misconduct, and
deterrence requires a certain level of knowledge, deliberation, or high
level of assumption of risk, it is hard to imagine how cases of objective
mistakes of law in assessing the applicability of the exclusionary rule
would be any different to those assessing the constitutionality of the
search or seizure. 110
The majority and concurring opinions in Heien help canvass the
threshold for instances when police officers are reasonable in
mistakenly believing the law covers their conduct; in other words, when
a mistake of law is reasonable for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 111 Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized
the ambiguity in the statutory language that used both the singular and
plural forms for “stop lamp” and the fact that this case was the first
time appellate courts had interpreted the ambiguous provision for
brake lights. 112 Justices Kagan and Ginsburg, in their concurring
opinion, elaborated further on the requirement that mistakes of law be
“objectively reasonable” and the “important limitations” of Heien, 113
stipulating police mistakes of law are reasonable in “exceedingly rare”
circumstances. 114 These “exceedingly rare” circumstances occur when
the question of law is considered “genuinely ambiguous” and “so
doubtful in construction” 115 that courts and reasonable judges disagree
with one another or agree with the officer’s statutory interpretation
110. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 991 (1984) (emphasizing the deterrent
purpose of the rule); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1995) (noting historical roots of the
deterrent purpose); Herring, 555 U.S. at 140–41 (clarifying that exclusionary rule applies when
there is an appreciable deterrent effect); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976) (finding
that the exclusionary rule is not a right and applies only where it “result[s] in appreciable
deterrence”).
111. Heien, 574 U.S. at 68 (Kagan, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 67–68 (majority opinion).
113. Id. at 68–69 (Kagan, J., concurring) (highlighting the inability to rely on a police officer’s
subjective understanding of law and the rigorous analysis the Court undertakes).
114. Id. at 70.
115. Id. Several courts have adopted an “ambiguity” test as a requirement for applying Heien,
though it is not clear Justice Kagan intended for this ambiguity test to be a definitive requirement.
See, e.g., Flint v. City of Milwaukee, 91 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1057 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (holding that
determining whether a mistake of law was reasonable requires first determining that the statute
is ambiguous); United States v. Lawrence, 675 Fed. App’x 1, 4–5 (1st Cir. 2017) (conducting
mistake of law analysis by evaluating whether statute was ambiguous); United States v. Diaz, 854
F.3d 197, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that a mistake of law is reasonable only when the law at
issue is ambiguous); United States v. Stanbridge, 813 F.3d 1032, 1037 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing
United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2015)) (“Heien does not support the
proposition that a police officer acts in an objectively reasonable manner by misinterpreting an
unambiguous statute.”).
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after “really difficult” and “very hard” interpretative work. 116 The
natural question follows: Are there any instances in which a mistake of
law will be unreasonable under the “objective reasonableness” test of
the Fourth Amendment but reasonable under the “objective
reasonableness” test of the exclusionary rule? The short answer is no,
and this is what makes the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
redundant in cases where mistakes can control for both the
constitutional right as well as the exclusionary rule remedy.
To see this point, it is helpful to revisit some of the good faith
exception cases the Court has decided and examine them to see if they
can be framed as Fourth Amendment questions. Doing so under a
categorical examination will help assess which categories of “good faith
exception” cases beyond those falling directly under Heien qualify for
my proposed revisionist approach, which do not, and why.
1. Probable Cause Cases
As I mentioned above, some of the good faith exception cases
were not decided as Fourth Amendment cases because the parties
conceded the constitutional question, thus limiting the Court’s analysis
to the question of remedy. Herring was one such case where the police
relied on an erroneous data entry that a warrant was outstanding for
the defendant. The parties agreed that the arrest was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment but disputed whether contraband found during the
search must be excluded. 117 If the parties had not come to this
concession, the critical question would have been whether the officer’s
reliance on the computer system erroneously indicating a warrant as a
basis for probable cause to perform a seizure was objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. 118 Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, hinted to this issue, writing that a reasonable but mistaken
belief that the officer had probable cause for a search or seizure does
not necessarily mean that the person seized or searched has been the
victim of a constitutional violation since probable cause “does not
demand all possible precision.” 119
According to the Court, the good faith inquiry to the exclusionary
rule “is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a
116. Heien, 574 U.S. at 68–70 (Kagan, J., concurring).
117. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009).
118. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (recognizing a warrant
exception for arrest of an individual who commits a crime in an officer’s presence, as long as the
arrest is supported by probable cause).
119. Herring, 555 U.S. at 139.
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reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was
illegal” under a totality of circumstances test. 120 This standard appears
no different from the Fourth Amendment objective reasonable mistake
of law standard under Heien had the Court been given the chance to
ask the constitutional question of whether the officer’s reliance on an
erroneous computer record was “reasonable” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The Court even suggested that searches in
reliance on warrants are unreasonable when no valid warrant has
actually issued and “systemic” data-entry errors have previously taken
place. 121 The Court considered these same points in deciding the matter
of exclusion, suggesting that “[i]f the police have been shown to be
reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made
false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion
would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct
cause a Fourth Amendment violation.” 122 The overlapping inquiries
speak to the misplaced nature of the reasonable mistake question,
which courts under my revisionist approach can now assess under the
Fourth Amendment, rendering any secondary inquiry under the
exclusionary rule redundant. Of course, this does not foreclose the fact
that courts can take into account other reasons that would render a
search or seizure unconstitutional beyond the issue of mistake of law in
their Fourth Amendment assessment.
Consider also Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Herring, which
identified as the main problem with the majority’s treatment of the
reasonableness of an officer’s mistake of law to be its focus on police
culpability demonstrated by systemic error or flagrant intent. 123 The
inquiry into the circumstances of the mistake makes more sense as a
misplaced inquiry into whether the search or seizure was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment to begin with. Reasonable and welltrained police officers are bound to be aware, or at least suspicious, of
instances of systemic and recurring record-keeping negligence in their
police departments, as they are the ones who are performing daily
investigations. Reasonable, well-trained officers are bound to identify
systemic inaccuracies on collections of electronic information. This
awareness manifests in an officer’s belief that a search or seizure is
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional because information
under these circumstances would not be immediately relied upon to
provide the police with probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 145 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984)).
Id. at 146.
Id.
See id. at 148–49 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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search or seizure. Thus, the police would not act reasonably under the
Fourth Amendment if they relied on what they knew or suspected to be
inaccurate information to pursue a search or seizure. In turn, isolated
incidents would not put police officers on notice to suspect systemic
misconduct and be more careful in processing information as it comes
in. Therefore, relying on information that officers would reasonably
believe to be correct in order to assess their actions under the Fourth
Amendment would be, well, reasonable.
Lower courts have already extended the reasonable mistake of
law standard of Heien to cases requiring probable cause to conclude that
police officers who made a reasonable mistake of law had probable
cause to search or seize. The majority opinion in Heien had, in dicta,
referred to reasonable suspicion as well as probable cause, so it is
unsurprising that lower courts undertook this extension. 124 For
instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, citing
directly to Heien, found that an officer had probable cause to arrest
under a reasonable belief that an apartment-building stairwell is a
public place for purposes of open-container law. 125 The U.S. Courts of
Appeal for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have also cited to Heien for
the proposition that police who made objective mistakes of law
nevertheless had probable cause. 126 Taken together, it is safe to suggest
that the revisionist approach this Article proposes can apply similarly
to cases of probable cause as it does to cases of reasonable suspicion.
2. Binding Law Cases
In Davis, the police searched a car based on appellate precedent
permitting searches of the passenger compartment when one is
arrested in a vehicle. 127 Davis’s case was on appeal when the Court
overturned this precedent, rendering the manner in which the vehicle’s
search took place in Davis newly unconstitutional. 128 Despite this
development, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
124. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 62–63, 66–68 (2014) (discussing probable cause
and reasonable suspicion); id. at 72–74 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (likewise discussing probable
cause precedents).
125. United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2017).
126. Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2015); Beckham v. City of Euclid, 689 Fed.
App’x 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2017).
127. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981).
128. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (rejecting a broad reading of Belton and ruling
that police may only search a car incident to arrest if arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the car at time of the search); see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (holding
that a change of rule in criminal proceedings must apply retroactively to all federal and state cases
pending review or not closed).
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declined to suppress the contraband discovered in the vehicle and
affirmed Davis’ conviction. 129 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that
searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding
appellate precedent, while unconstitutional, are not subject to the
exclusionary rule. 130 In Illinois v. Krull, the police, pursuant to an
existing statute that permitted certain warrantless searches, examined
stolen motor vehicles in a junkyard. 131 The next day, the Illinois
Supreme Court struck down this statute as unconstitutional. 132 The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the officer’s reliance on the existing
statute at the time of the search was reasonable, and therefore the
exclusionary rule did not apply due to the good faith exception. 133
In cases like Davis and Illinois v. Krull, the question of
constitutionality of police conduct will always hinge on the new law that
overturns precedent or renders existing statutes unconstitutional.
Courts no longer assess the reasonableness of the police conduct in
these cases under what was constitutional at the time of the search or
seizure, but rather under the new standard that is applied
retroactively. 134 Thus, these police mistakes of law are largely artificial.
The issue is not really a matter of a mistaken reliance on the law but
instead one of nonmistaken reliance on what was good law but is no
longer controlling after the fact, provided that the case is pending in the
courts. Thus, any new change in the law will always control the Fourth
Amendment inquiry under retroactivity rules, and police conduct will
always be deemed unreasonable. As a result, the only step at which
courts can actually assess the reasonableness of the police mistake of
law based on what controlled at the time of the search or seizure is at
the exclusionary rule remedy, through the good faith exception. In this
category of cases, where police rely on later invalidated law as the case
is pending in the courts, the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule does not become redundant despite my proposed revisionist
approach.
B. The Case for Constitutional Innovation and Erosion
Some might argue there is more value in the status quo of having
two distinct moments of assessing the reasonableness of a police
mistake of law in a search or seizure and that, if we reduce them into
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010).
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2011).
480 U.S. 340, 343 (1987).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 360.
See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987).
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one assessment under the proposed revisionist approach, courts may
lose the benefit of saying some searches are unreasonable, and thus
unconstitutional, but just not unreasonable enough to apply the
exclusionary rule. They might also argue that the proposed approach
would erode the Fourth Amendment, as courts may give too much of the
benefit of the doubt to police officers when assessing their mistake or
be tempted to find mistakes of law reasonable and therefore find
searches or seizures constitutional—even when courts really think they
are unconstitutional—to avoid the exclusionary remedy that would
result. 135
First, courts arguably already do this whether they accept my
revisionist approach or not. Consider the highly publicized O.J.
Simpson criminal case. The court had to decide on the existence of
exigent circumstances in discussing potential Fourth Amendment
violations and the exclusionary rule remedy after the police performed
a warrantless search in the defendant’s residence. 136 The presence of
what appeared to be particularly important evidence, such as a bloody
glove, arguably pushed the court to find that the warrantless search
was justified by exigent circumstances despite the absence of a victim
or offender in the premises searched and to deny the defense’s motion
to suppress the evidence. 137 While this case differs in part from our
cases here, it speaks to the point that courts already take into account
the potential outcome of remedies when they ascertain rights.
Second, this critique resembles a line of thinking emphasizing
that curtailments of remedies may encourage courts to be more liberal

135. See, e.g., Search and Seizure—Reasonable Mistake of Law—Heien v. North Carolina, 129
HARV. L. REV. 251, 259 (2015) (discussing Heien and observing that the concurrence’s framework
used unworkable terms); Richard H. McAdams, Close Enough for Government Work? Heien’s LessThan-Reasonable Mistake of the Rule of Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 147, 148–49, 178 (criticizing
Heien for granting police more discretion and for its inconsistency with the vagueness doctrine).
But see Orin Kerr, Reasonable Mistake of Law Can Generate Reasonable Suspicion, Supreme Court
POST:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Dec.
15,
2014),
Holds,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/15/reasonable-mistake-oflaw-can-generate-reasonable-suspicion-supreme-court-holds
[https://perma.cc/6J42-B77J]
(arguing that the Court in Heien went far in describing “a much narrower test than a reasonable
officer” to emphasize its exceptional applicability).
136. See Simpson Murder Case: Transcript of Ruling Denying Motion to Suppress Evidence,
L.A. TIMES (July 8, 1994, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-07-08-mn13294-story.html [https://perma.cc/9DJC-3J99].
137. See id.:
Contrary to the suggestions in defense argument [sic] that this ruling . . . would mean
the end of the 4th Amendment . . . , I disagree. And I think one only needs to look as far
as the fact that a short time after the glove was discovered, that the officers did in fact
obtain a search warrant . . . .
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in facilitating constitutional change. 138 Assuming that constitutional
rights are dynamic through interpretation, this could suggest that
curtailment of the exclusionary rule remedy may in fact result in the
positive effect of courts developing Fourth Amendment doctrine more
liberally. This idea is most associated with damages-producing
remedies. John Jeffries argues that when remedies for constitutional
violations are limited, courts may foster constitutional law
development. 139 “The doctrines that deny full individual remediation
reduce the cost of innovation, thereby advancing the growth and
development of constitutional law.” 140 Jeffries uses the example of the
structural reform litigation cases, particularly Brown v. Board of
Education. 141 At the time when the Court decided Brown, class action
lawsuits did not permit “mass tort” litigation, 142 and courts had not
rediscovered § 1983 damages actions. 143 Jeffries argues that if Brown
had been decided today, the potential damages to be paid by local school
districts would have been astronomically high due to the expansion of
available remedies, 144 so that the Court may have come out differently
on the case or delayed the decision further. 145 In other words, a stronger
remedy may cause the stagnation of the right.
To the degree this argument holds, it does so mostly in the
context of remedies that entail multiparty actions and compensation
rather than prophylactic remedies like the exclusionary rule. The
remedial doctrine for unconstitutional searches has moved away from
the pecuniary damages system before Mapp, 146 in part to remove the
counterincentives of damages but also to allow remediation by
depriving the police of their ill-gotten gains. 147 Even if the argument
138. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,
113 (1999) (noting the cost incentive for constitutional change and shift towards substantive
constitutional reform when there is a gap between rights and remedies).
139. Id. at 90.
140. Id. at 98.
141. Id. at 101–03; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954). For the history of
Brown, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976); and Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994).
142. See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 941, 945 (1995) (noting that the term “mass tort” was not yet coined as late as 1969).
143. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that the city of Chicago was not
liable for a Fourth Amendment violation by city police officers because § 1983 did not extend to
municipal governments).
144. Jeffries, supra note 138, at 101–02.
145. Id.
146. See William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 443, 449 (1997) (noting a decrease in damages claims as remedy).
147. See id. (finding that a damages system highlights extreme police misconduct such as
police brutality and illegal arrests).
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were applicable to the exclusionary rule type of remedy, while it is
impossible to predict how courts would transfigure constitutional
rights, assessing police mistakes of law as part of the inquiry into
Fourth Amendment rights could push Fourth Amendment doctrine
towards a more rule-like standard with clearer and more precise
permutations, engendering constitutional innovation instead of
perpetuating existing stagnation.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF VIEWING GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION CASES AS
FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES
Seeing the good faith exception cases of the exclusionary rule as
Fourth Amendment cases that involve an inquiry into the potential
constitutional violation has a number of important implications. In this
Part, I discuss how this approach fits within the larger debate about
constitutional rights and remedies and existing doctrine on Fourth
Amendment exclusion; how it benefits the evolution of Fourth
Amendment doctrine through criminal courts, the establishment of
bright-line rules for police misconduct, and the preservation of a
meaningful exclusionary rule, while not negatively impacting
defendants’ prospects for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claims.
A. Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibration
The cause and effect relationship that the Court established in
the good faith exception strand of cases between the culpability of the
police on the one hand and the deterrence value of evidence suppression
on the other has prompted several commentators to side with Justice
Breyer’s dissent in Davis, maintaining the Court treats the
exclusionary rule more like a punitive sanction rather than a remedy to
Fourth Amendment violations. 148 They argue the Court has severed
right from remedy, leaving individuals with a Fourth Amendment right
but no effective remedy in criminal trials. 149 Seeing the good faith
148. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 254 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that
retroactively applying a new rule implies the existence of a remedy); William C. Heffernan, The
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 825 (2000)
(noting the Court’s use of exclusion as remedy only after cost-benefit analysis); David Gray,
Meagan Cooper & David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91
TEX. L. REV. 7, 11 (2012) (analyzing the use of the exclusionary rule as the only remedy for a Fourth
Amendment violation after Weeks).
149. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Constitutional Rule as a Constitutional
Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357, 378 (2013) (analyzing Justice Alito’s decision to interpret the
exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy, rather than a Fourth Amendment right).
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exception cases as Fourth Amendment cases that determine when the
remedy is triggered can alleviate this tension.
The Court, in keeping the exclusionary rule separate from the
Fourth Amendment, has consistently shied away from drawing any
meaningful connection between Fourth Amendment constitutional
rights and the exclusionary rule remedy. This approach reflects the
broader constitutional legal theory and jurisprudential view of a
distinction between constitutional law and ordinary law, 150 as well as
the principle of separation of powers between the legislature and
judiciary. 151 Owen Fiss describes rights as “the true meaning
of . . . constitutional values such as equality, liberty, [and] due
process” 152 while remedies are a “subsidiary” and “instrumental” means
to “actualize” these values, not corollaries to rights. 153 This “rightsessentialist” 154 approach anticipates that courts will corrupt and distort
the meaning of constitutional rights by tailoring them to fit available
remedies. 155
As the Fourth Amendment exclusion doctrine stood before
Heien, courts had no opportunity to examine how a reasonable mistake
of law impacted the constitutionality of a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. If an officer acted under a mistaken reliance on a
law, however reasonable, courts would find that a constitutional
violation had taken place and defendants would likely move to suppress
evidence. In the assessment of the remedy, courts would examine
whether the mistake of law was reasonable, which meant that evidence
would not be suppressed, or if the mistake of law was unreasonable,
which meant that evidence would be suppressed. In other words, the
Court reserved the exclusionary rule remedy for mistakes of law that
were so unreasonable that courts deemed them necessary to deter in
150. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1999) (explaining this distinction as means to protect the purity of constitutional
rights rather than dilute those rights with real-world application).
151. Brittanee Friedman, Comment, Constitutional Law—Evidence Seized Based on
Reasonable Police Mistake of Law Held Admissible in North Carolina Court—State v. Heien, 737
S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2012), 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 256 (2014) (noting the expected separation of
powers responsibilities between legislature and judiciary).
152. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 51 (1979). But see Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 677–80
(1983) (disagreeing with Fiss’s bifurcation of constitutional right and remedy).
153. Fiss, supra note 152, at 51–52.
154. See Levinson, supra note 150, at 858 (naming the theory of rights as separate from
remedy as “rights essentialism”).
155. See Fiss, supra note 152, at 54–55 (warning that judges may narrow rights to better
match remedies); PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 26–28 (1983) (highlighting the distinct
differences between rights and remedies and flaws when one mistakenly compares them—rights
are present focused and encourage conversation and transformation; remedies are future oriented,
rational, and technical).
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the future. However, other unreasonable searches that were also
unconstitutional did not require the application of the exclusionary rule
because courts considered them less worthy of deterrence.
After Heien, however, courts have the opportunity to examine
the officer’s mistake of law at the step of assessing the constitutionality
of a search or seizure. If an officer’s mistake of law is reasonable, this
means that no constitutional violation has taken place and therefore no
remedy is triggered. If, however, an officer’s mistake of law is
unreasonable, courts will find that a constitutional violation has taken
place, triggering the question of evidence suppression as a remedy.
Under the proposed revisionist approach in the cases to which it
applies, if courts find a constitutional violation, they will also find that
evidence suppression applies directly. This approach ties the Fourth
Amendment right more directly to the remedy, as exclusion of evidence
will now flow directly from a constitutional violation. Does this suggest
that the Fourth Amendment exclusion analysis is directly derived from
the Constitution? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that when the Court
articulates the appropriate standard for Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, it is, in fact, making constitutional law. At the same
time, I do not claim the exclusionary rule itself forms part of the Fourth
Amendment. This claim would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to
defend persuasively under existing doctrine, 156 though some have
tried. 157 Instead, reasonableness in the context of Fourth Amendment
exclusion represents the constitutional standard that helps implement
the criminal procedure rights and remedies to which it applies.
In judicial practice, “constitutional rights are inevitably shaped
by, and incorporate, remedial concerns.” 158 This idea, which Daryl
Levinson coined as “remedial equilibration,” 159 reflects the way I
156. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238 (2011) (stating the exclusionary rule is a
judicially created doctrine); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (noting the Fourth
Amendment does not contain the exclusionary rule).
157. See Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment, supra note 45, at 231 (arguing that a
new approach to the exclusionary rule will be found in old words of the Fourth Amendment); see
also LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.3(c) (explaining that courts previously held the exclusionary rule
was part of the Fourth Amendment).
158. Levinson, supra note 150, at 873; PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 811–14 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the use of
remedies to structurally redefine rights in reform cases); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary
Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 683–88 (1982)
(analyzing the Court’s tendency to limit the ability of federal judges to determine remedy); cf.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (noting various results that can occur when a court
determines an entitlement).
159. Levinson, supra note 150, at 858.
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understand the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary rule and provides an additional reason why the proposed
revisionist approach will not result in the reduction of Fourth
Amendment protections but rather in their enhancement. According to
remedial equilibration, rights themselves are shaped by the remedy
that follows their violation. The value of the right is also a function of
the nature of consequences the remedy brings, 160 that is, having a “right
with less remedy is worth less and a right with more remedy is worth
more.” 161 The relationship between rights and remedies is thus
reciprocal. Unlike rights-essentialist approaches that identify
causation running only from rights to remedies and emphasizing
remedies as a product of rights, rights equilibration identifies causation
also running from remedies to rights, where remedies also shape and
affect rights through judicial decisions. 162 Any expansion or contraction
of the remedy can cause constitutional rights to be enlarged,
compressed, or eviscerated. 163
In the context of Fourth Amendment exclusion, if we accept that
some of the shape and value of the Fourth Amendment right is tied to
what the courts will do if the police violate it, the erosion of the
exclusionary rule remedy through its series of exceptions equals the
erosion of the Fourth Amendment right. 164 And indeed, the current
erosion of the exclusionary rule remedy through the doctrine is, in fact,
responsible for the shrinking of Fourth Amendment protections. Carol
Steiker has, in fact, documented how the proliferating exceptions to
Fourth and Fifth Amendment remedies have eroded the substance of
these constitutional rights. 165
In the pre-Heien doctrine, the balancing of individual privacy
against governmental intrusion as a measure of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness is undermined by the differently motivated balancing of
individual privacy versus police deterrence under the remedial analysis
of the good faith exception’s reasonableness question. But if one accepts
160. Id. at 874.
161. Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 884.
163. Id. at 887.
164. See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 88 (1960) (“Absence of remedy is
absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect of right. A right is as big, precisely, as what the courts
will do.”); see also Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 943 (2d
Cir. 1930) (Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, noted that “a right without any remedy is
a meaningless scholasticism”).
165. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2485–2503, 2505–21 (1996) (showing how in the
Fourth Amendment context both the right (i.e., where warrants are required) and the remedy of
exclusion have been substantially scaled back).
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that courts consider remedies when they discern rights under remedial
equilibration, the revisionist approach of this Article would in fact lead
to more expansive Fourth Amendment protections. By effectively
tethering the application of the remedy to the violation of the
constitutional right, the exclusionary rule becomes a clear and direct
remedy, the enhancement of which bolsters the Fourth Amendment
rights that it is tied to. If nothing else, courts will now be forced to move
beyond principled or pragmatic divides between rights and remedies
and instead focus on the substantive standards underpinning them.
Shifting the courts’ inquiries in this way will provide an opportunity to
advance constitutional doctrine.
B. Fourth Amendment Evolution in Criminal Courts & Establishing
Bright Lines for Police Misconduct
Viewing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule cases
as Fourth Amendment cases can create coherence and clear standards
within the Fourth Amendment by forcing its evolution and norm
articulation through criminal proceedings. 166 In the past, the Court has
declared that most Fourth Amendment issues arise out of criminal
cases. 167 But as it stands, oftentimes the inquiry centers not around
whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation, but whether the
“good faith” exception should bar suppression of the evidence. Without
the problematic outcomes of the “good faith” exception strand of cases
and by shifting courts’ focus instead to the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment in the cases of police mistakes of law,
criminal cases can contribute more to the evolution of Fourth
Amendment doctrine. 168
Parties and courts will have to address all issues of mistake of
law reasonableness on the merits of the constitutional violation instead
of conceding such a violation with near certainty that they then can
claim an exception to the application of the exclusionary rule on the
basis of “good faith.” 169 The erosion of the exclusionary rule as an
effective remedy has bred cynicism towards the Fourth Amendment

166. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 11, at 630 (emphasizing that the Court revisiting
Fourth Amendment doctrine would be costless).
167. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).
168. Most criminal cases take place in state court as Stone bars federal habeas review of
Fourth Amendment issues, and the only other available federal review is discretionary certiorari
review in the Court. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 (1976).
169. For a different opinion on basis of the Heien decision, compare McAdams, supra note 135,
at 178.
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reminiscent of the pre-Boyd era where, 170 due to lack of available
remedy, the Court never addressed the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment at all. 171 Because of the erosion of the exclusionary rule as
a remedy, courts have thus far tended to only address the original
Fourth Amendment issues in obiter dictum, or not at all, 172 effectively
stilting the development of Fourth Amendment doctrine. Recognizing
the redundancy of the good faith exception in certain categories of cases
has the potential of advancing Fourth Amendment doctrine through
criminal courts, as the Court always envisioned. 173
The Court has also emphatically spoken about the importance of
having bright-line rules regarding the Fourth Amendment in order to
better guide police officers who need to make swift decisions. 174 Existing
doctrine has shifted this much-needed task to a case-by-case analysis of
remedial issues in the good faith exception cases. 175 By answering the
question of reasonableness of police mistakes of law as part of the
inquiry assessing the Fourth Amendment substantive right, courts will
have the opportunity to establish bright-line rules that govern police
(mis)conduct in cases of mistakes of law for the purpose of upholding
constitutional rights. Such normative development of the Fourth
Amendment will hopefully rid many of the impression that courts pick
and choose how and when they uphold the constitutional right, which
has made it increasingly difficult for individuals to know whether they
have been subjected to an unlawful search or seizure and how to litigate
this matter with regards to suppressing potentially unlawful
evidence. 176
170. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (holding that unreasonable searches
and seizures violate a person’s Fourth Amendment rights).
171. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan
and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1741, 1751 (2008) (recognizing the rarity of judicial guidance to
police prior to Mapp v. Ohio); see also Kerr, supra note 60, at 1092–93 (discussing Paul Mishkin’s
argument in The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 56 (1965)).
172. See Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687,
732 (2011) (noting that finding a violation would be pointless without a remedy).
173. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241–42 (2009).
174. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
225–26 (1973). For critiques of the Court’s embrace of bright-line rules, see Donald A. Dripps, The
Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime
of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. L.J. 341, 342, 353 (2004); and Albert W. Alschuler, Bright-Line Fever
and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 231 (1984).
175. See Ngov, supra note 80, at 188–91 (examining the lack of incentive for police to learn
law); see also Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” From Start to Finish: Too Much
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1856–59 (2004) (examining
the confusion among police and judges over police practices during traffic stops, as seen in Whren).
176. Garrett, supra note 37, at 96; Kit Kinports, The Origins and Legacy of the Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness-Balancing Model, 71 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 157, 214–18 (2020)
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C. Preserving the Exclusionary Rule
The Court has treated the automatic application of the
exclusionary rule to Fourth Amendment violations as the source of
increased social costs of suppression, moving away from the reflexive
nature of the remedy by grounding the exclusionary rule in policy
arguments based on deterrence. 177 This move has caused valid concerns
that the exclusionary rule is on the road to extinction as a remedy. 178
The proposed approach shifts the burden away from the exclusionary
rule, having long been the center of judicial attack, and allows it to
develop as a direct remedy to Fourth Amendment violations by
alleviating the concerns of both those emphasizing the dangers of
reflexive evidence suppression and those fearing the dissolution of the
exclusionary rule.
Acknowledging the redundancy of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule when mistakes of law are assessed in the first step of
the constitutional assessment in searches and seizures allows courts to
build a constitutional framework that does not depend on and is not
affected by the application of the remedy. Rather, it operates
deliberately on the basis of courts’ comprehensive evaluation of
potential claims under constitutional standards. This outcome will
arguably also further the exclusionary rule goal of deterring future
police misconduct as it ties deterrence directly with the conduct courts
are aiming to deter under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, without the
need for the good faith strand of exceptions, the exclusionary rule will
less likely be the subject of poorly justified, proliferating exceptions that
are a back door for judicial policymaking sometimes intending its
extinction.
D. No Negative Impact for § 1983 Claims
Even though the revisionist approach I propose in this Article
directly relates to procedures before criminal courts, decisions before
these courts on potential Fourth Amendment violations can affect
(analyzing the divide among state and lower courts over balancing analysis and lack of clear
rationale given by courts).
177. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011) (explaining the exclusionary
rule’s purpose is to deter violations); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255:
A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 388–89 (1964) (highlighting that the exclusionary rule
functions to create obedience to the Fourth Amendment); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
143 (2009) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 929, 951 (1965)) (noting the exclusionary rule’s sole purpose is deterrence).
178. Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 45, at 175–79.
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constitutional tort claims. 179 Would adopting this revisionist proposal
mean that a defendant may be worse off in the process of seeking
compensatory, declaratory, or injunctive relief through a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 civil rights claim against the arresting officer or municipality?
The short answer is no.
Federal law provides civil liability for anyone who, under the
color of law, violates another’s federal rights. 180 This is limited by the
doctrine of qualified immunity, 181 which “shields officials from civil
liability so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights.’ ” 182 The Court has said that a “clearly
established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
right.’ ” 183 The threshold for a right being clearly established, such that
liability can attach, is quite high: the Court has held that “precedent
must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond
debate.” 184 “Put simply, qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” 185
While incorporating mistakes of law in the context of Fourth
Amendment exclusion may appear to have parallels with the doctrine
of qualified immunity, 186 they have important threshold differences
that explain why I do not foresee any negative impact on constitutional
tort claims. In Heien, the Court made clear that the reasonable police
mistake of law threshold “is not as forgiving [to the officer]” as the one
employed in “qualified immunity.” 187 Justice Kagan, in her concurrence,
went a step further to emphasize that the Fourth Amendment
reasonable mistake of law assessment is “more demanding” on police
officers than the assessment for qualified immunity, purposely drawing
distinct lines between the two tests and their thresholds. 188 Despite the
absence of clearer language in the Court’s holding regarding how much
more forgiving to the officer or demanding to the plaintiff the qualified
179. See Teressa Ravenell & Riley H. Ross III, Policing Symmetry, 99 N.C. L. REV. 379, 400–
10 (2021) (arguing that issue preclusion and claim preclusion have the potential to impact § 1983
claims).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
181. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982).
182. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).
183. Id. (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
184. Id. at 12 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
185. Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
186. See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 74 (2011) (suggesting
that, pre-Heien, reasonable mistakes of law are not Fourth Amendment violations).
187. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 67 (2014).
188. Id. at 69 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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immunity test is, we do know that the Court has intended for this
standard to set a higher threshold to establish liability for the
constitutional violation when compared to the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard. 189 If nothing else, what the Court made clear
is that there are cases in which a police officer’s mistake of law is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but the same officer is
entitled to qualified immunity barring civil liability for the Fourth
Amendment violation. 190 This is the reason why the proposed approach
would leave the outcome of § 1983 claims unaffected.
To illustrate this point, I lay out two potential scenarios that can
arise in the same hypothetical case: (1) under the existing legal
framework; and (2) under my proposed framework. Assume the
following fictional scenario: The police have received a tip that illegal
drugs can be found at John Doe’s home. They go to a magistrate to get
a warrant. The magistrate grants the warrant under a mistaken belief
that she has jurisdiction over the place to be searched. John Doe is now
at trial and argues in court that the police have violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting an unlawful search based on an
invalid warrant.
Scenario 1—Existing Framework: At the state criminal court,
the judge will have to ask whether the search was unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment in order to determine whether the police
violated John Doe’s Fourth Amendment rights. Under the Leon line of
cases, 191 the judge will likely hold that there was a Fourth Amendment
violation against John Doe because a search under an invalid warrant
is an unreasonable search. 192 When John Doe moves to suppress the
evidence collected through this unlawful search, the criminal court will
likely dismiss the motion because they will find that the police’s
mistaken belief on the validity of the warrant was in “good faith”
reasonable reliance on the law, which means that exclusion will not
deter future police misconduct. If John Doe wishes to also file a § 1983
civil claim against the arresting officer, the federal court will, under
Allen, 193 likely follow the state criminal court’s Fourth Amendment

189. Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
190. See Weinberger, supra note 101, at 1582 (emphasizing the distinction between Heien’s
holding and qualified immunity); see also United States v. Longoria, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1181
(N.D. Fla. 2016) (explaining that competent officers can still commit unreasonable mistakes).
191. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); Illinois
v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
192. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905–25.
193. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (noting that federal courts generally give
preclusive effect to state court judgments).
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finding that a constitutional violation has taken place. 194 When the
court examines qualified immunity, they will have to assess whether
the right violated was clearly established at the time that the police
officer committed the act. Given the Court’s existing threshold analysis
under Heien, it is near impossible that an officer’s mistake of law would
be sufficiently reasonable to warrant no suppression in the criminal
context while the defendant’s right is simultaneously so wellestablished as to survive a qualified immunity defense.
Scenario 2—Revisionist Framework: The state criminal court
holds that no Fourth Amendment violation took place because the police
mistake of law was reasonable, which renders the search reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. On this basis, the criminal court denies
the motion to suppress that John Doe’s attorney has filed. If John Doe
wishes to file a § 1983 civil claim against the arresting officer, he will
likely be precluded from bringing this under Allen 195 since the criminal
court has already found that no Fourth Amendment violation has taken
place. Even if the state criminal court constitutional decision did not
bar John Doe from bringing a § 1983 claim, the federal court would
likely find either no Fourth Amendment violation or no clearly
established right, if the court began with the qualified immunity
analysis. 196 These equivalent end results in either scenario are because,
given the Court’s existing threshold analysis under Heien, 197 the
standard for reasonable mistake of law under the Fourth Amendment
is less forgiving to the officer than that for qualified immunity for the
§ 1983 claim. 198 This means that John Doe would never succeed on the
§ 1983 claim even if preclusion was not an issue.
While I am sympathetic to the concerns that developments in
Fourth Amendment litigation could affect important civil rights claims
under § 1983, for the reasons discussed above I argue that this is not
plausible. Given the higher threshold for qualified immunity, any case
that fails to survive the reasonable mistake of law standard under the
Fourth Amendment would have otherwise lost under qualified
immunity because the right would not have been sufficiently clearly
established under the existing legal standard.

194. See Ravenell & Ross, supra note 179, at 401 (examining how § 1983 binds courts to prior
probable cause precedent).
195. Allen, 449 U.S. at 96.
196. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that courts are not required
to begin their analysis with the Fourth Amendment question).
197. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 65–66 (2014).
198. Id. at 67.
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CONCLUSION
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule has long been
a source of profound confusion and critique. Yet perhaps the solution to
the doctrine’s problem has long been staring us in the face. After the
Court’s decision in Heien, police officers’ reasonable mistakes of law can
now form part of the inquiry into the Fourth Amendment constitutional
right, subsuming the repeat, and, as I argue, redundant mistake of law
inquiry into the exclusionary rule remedy. This allows courts to finally
approach matters of police mistakes of law not as a distinct matter of
remedy, but as part of one cohesive inquiry stemming from Fourth
Amendment substance and resolving the question of exclusionary rule
remedy. But why should we care about this revisionist approach to
Fourth Amendment exclusion? First, there is value to a system’s
internal coherence. For too long our doctrine on Fourth Amendment
exclusion has rested on fundamental problems and ambiguities. Courts
have long approached the exclusionary rule as a medicine to
discontinue before it turned to poison, and scholars have repeatedly
treated the resulting Fourth Amendment exclusion doctrine as futile or
hopeless. The revisionist approach of this Article can provide coherence
in an area that requires definite rules and standards to delimit police
discretion. Most importantly, this approach has one practical payoff: it
requires courts to be clear about how police mistakes of law weigh into
the balance between individual privacy and government interests in
policing rather than using the “good faith” exception as an easy way to
dismiss defendants’ suppression motions. Courts will no longer be able
to broadly declare that the police have violated the Fourth Amendment
while in the same breath undercutting the value of remedying this
violation by using two different assessments of what constitutes one
reasonable police officer. That is just bad reasoning.

